In the changing landscape of the todays Internet, several solutions are under investigation to allow efficient, flexible and scalable multihoming. One of the proposals is shim6, a host-based multihoming solution based on the use of multiple IPv6 addresses on each host. In this work, we first describe the main features of this protocol, then we explain our implementation of shim6, along with the associated security mechanisms in the Linux kernel and, finally, we evaluate its performance. In particular, we analyse the performance impact of the security mechanisms used by shim6 and the impact of shim6 on the performance of end-host systems, especially heavily loaded servers. We conclude by discussing the remaining open issues for a widespread deployment of host-based multihoming techniques such as shim6.
Introduction
The current IPv4 Internet is facing several challenges. Firstly, the IP version 4 (IPv4) address space is limited and the latest projections 1 indicate that during the year 2011 all IPv4 addresses will have been allocated. Secondly, operators and researchers are becoming more and more concerned about the limits on the scalability of the current Internet architecture [30] .
For a number of years, several groups have tried to address these problems. Within the IETF, the work on the development of a replacement for IPv4 started more than 15 years ago with the work on IP next generation. This initiated the development of IP version 6 (IPv6) that was expected to replace IP version 4 before the beginning of this century. Today, IPv6 is now supported by most host and server operating systems. However deployment by network operators is still limited but appears to have been growing recently [24] . We can thus expect that IPv6 will gain more and more importance over the next few years.
On the other hand, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) has identified several limitations of the current Internet architecture [30] . The first problem is the scalability of the interdomain routing system. This is reflected by the growth of the BGP routing tables and also the growth in the number of messages processed by BGP routers. This routing scalability issue is caused by several main factors. An initial contributor is multihoming, i.e. when an IP network is attached to several Internet Service Providers that need to advertise the corresponding prefix to the global Internet. Another contributor to the growth of the BGP routing tables are the various BGP-based traffic engineering techniques used by network operators to control the flow of their Internet traffic [20, 40] . Finally, the allocation of IP addresses also contributes to the BGP growth. In the early days of the Internet, IP address blocks were allocated on a first-come first-served basis. This led to a huge consumption of address blocks that are almost impossible to aggregate. Since the introduction of Classless Interdomain Routing (CIDR), IP address blocks are allocated by Regional Registries (RIRs). There are two types of address block allocations: Provider Independent (PI) and Provider Aggregatable (PA). In the early days, PI address blocks were reserved for Internet Service Providers and customer networks could not obtain such address blocks directly from the RIRs. This allocation policy assumed that customer networks would be single homed and that they would renumber their network each time they change provider. These assumptions do not hold anymore and many enterprise networks insist on obtaining PI address blocks, which contributes to the growth of the BGP routing tables [29] .
The second problem is the overloading of IP address semantics. IP addresses are used for two different purposes: identifiers and locators. In its identifier role, an IP address, combined with a port number, identifies an endpoint of a transport flow. In its locator role, an IP address identifies the paths to reach a host via one of its interfaces through a network.
The large IPv6 address space offers several opportunities to solve these problems differently than with IPv4. Several years ago, after evaluating many alternatives [17, 23] , the IETF chartered the shim6 working group to develop a host-based IPv6 multihoming solution [36] . The shim6 specifications are now ready and, in 0140-3664/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2011.03.005 this paper, we report our experience with one of the first complete and publicly available implementations of this IPv6 multihoming technique in the Linux kernel. This paper is organised as follows. First, as shim6 is not yet widely known, we describe its key features and benefits in Section 2. This is followed by a description of the architecture of our LinShim6 implementation in Section 3 and an evaluation of the performance of several of its key mechanisms. We conclude by reflecting on the evolution of host-based multihoming techniques based on our experience with shim6 in Section 4 and a discussion of related work in Section 5.
Shim6 host-based IPv6 multihoming
Before delving into the details of shim6, consider that there are at least two scenarios that can provide multihoming. The first type is when a single host has two or more IPv6 addresses from two or more layer-2 interfaces connected to separate networks. This can be the case of a laptop having both WiFi and 3G Internet interfaces, or servers having multiple Ethernet interfaces. In these cases, the multihomed host would like to either be able to efficiently use both interfaces simultaneously or use a primary interface, with automatic redirection of all packets over another interface upon failure of the primary one.
The second type of multihoming occurs when a campus, corporate or ISP network is attached to two different service providers. In such a network, each host gets an address from each service provider, and is accessible over both. A host in such a multihomed network can select, for itself, the provider to use for a given flow, through appropriate selection of the source address. Shim6 was designed with the latter form of multihoming in mind but also supports the former.
Today, in the IPv4 Internet, when a network is multihomed, it receives one IPv4 address range, and uses BGP to advertise its IPv4 prefix to its upstream providers which, in turn, advertise the network to the global Internet. This contributes to the growth of the BGP routing tables. If a link between the multihomed network and one of its providers fails, BGP re-converges, to ensure that the multihomed network remains reachable via its other providers. However, a network relying on shim6 for its multihoming behaves differently. The main difference from IPv4 multihoming is that each shim6 host has several IPv6 addresses, one from each of its providers or one on each of its interfaces. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The corporate network shown at the bottom of the figure is attached to ISP1 and ISP2. Each ISP has allocated a prefix to the corporate network. Each shim6 host has one IPv6 address inside each of these subnets. From a BGP routing table viewpoint, the main advantage of shim6 host-based multihoming is that AS1 and AS2 only need to advertise their global/32 IPv6 prefix and not the more specific prefixes allocated to their customers. However, this also implies that if the link between the corporate network and ISP1 fails, BGP will not announce the failure to the global Internet. This problem is solved in shim6 by using a new failure detection and recovery mechanism, the REAP protocol [4] , that allows shim6 hosts to detect a failure and switch traffic to an available working path.
In the following subsections, first we describe the shim6 architecture, then explain how shim6 solves the security issues and finally describe the REAP protocol.
Shim6
A shim6 host has several IPv6 addresses. All these addresses are locators, i.e. they identify where a network interface is located within the global routing context. For example, in Fig. 1 , a packet whose destination is ISP1.A will be delivered via ISP1. On the other hand, a packet whose destination is ISP2.A will be delivered via ISP2. As current best practice [9] recommends that ISPs verify the source address of packets received from their customers: a packet produced by host A that contains ISP1.A as its source address must always be sent via ISP1. Such a packet will never be forwarded by ISP2.
When an application on host A contacts an application on host B using an upper-layer protocol (ULP), the default address selected [18] by host A is determined to be the upper-layer identifier (ULID) to identify the transport flows between the hosts. Conceptually, the shim6 sublayer belongs to the network layer and the locators are attached to the lower part of the network layer while the identifier is attached to the upper part of the network layer (Fig. 2) .
The main purpose of shim6 is to preserve established flows in spite of network failures, while operating transparently to upperlayer protocols such as TCP or UDP. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Host A has established a flow between ULID ISP1.A and destination ISPX.B. In addition to its ULID, host A also has the ISP2.A locator. Upon failure of the path between ISP1.A and ISPX.B, host A will use shim6 to switch its flow on the ISP2.A ? ISPX.B path. For this, all of host A's packets destined to ISPX.B must be sent from source ISP2.A. Shim6 ensures the transparency of this operation to the applications.
The shim6 sublayer performs three different tasks. Firstly, two communicating shim6 hosts need to discover their respective locator sets. This is performed during the establishment of the shim6 session. Secondly, during the lifetime of a flow, it may be necessary to switch from the current path to an alternate, e.g. after a failure. Thirdly, shim6 can be used to advertise any change in the set of locators available on a host.
The first task is conducted at the beginning of a communication. When an application is requested to initiate an exchange towards a host (i.e. a http or other such request), the usual process is that its name is looked up from the Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS answers with one or several addresses. The application then initiates a connection with one of the obtained addresses (through default address selection) [18, 34, 35] .
A heuristic on one of the shim6-enabled hosts determines whether it is worth the extra shim6 overhead to protect the communication flow. In the case where the host decides that it is worth the effort, the end hosts communicate to each other their entire set of locators. This is the shim6 initial exchange. After this negotiation, each host has a set of local and peer addresses that it can use to carry packets.
The establishment of a shim6 session is performed by using a four-way handshake as shown in Fig. 3 . This handshake is based on the handshake used by HIP [32] . It was designed [36] to protect against replay attacks, to ensure that all announced addresses belong to the same peer, and to protect against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. More details about how and why the messages are exchanged this manner are available in [36, Section 7] . However, to understand this paper, it is sufficient to know that the most costly operation in a shim6 negotiation (in terms of processing power) is the address signature (which can be done in advance or offline) and verification. These operations are explained in the next subsection.
Typically the second task is triggered when the associated REAP protocol has detected a failure and found an alternate working locator pair. More generally, any appropriately interfaced entity (an application interface for example [27] ) could trigger a path change. Changing the path in the course of a communication is made possible by rewriting the address pair in use. Obviously one particular path is the one corresponding to the ULIDs. In this case the ULIDs and the locators are identical and no rewriting is needed. In all other cases, rewriting is needed and an extension header is added to the outgoing packets. The extension header contains a context tag used to identify the flow at the receiver, so that locators can be replaced by the correct ULIDs in the receiver.
The rewriting function of shim6 is located in a new IP-sublayer in the networking stack, as shown in Fig. 2 . Anything located above the shim6 layer sees stable addresses (ULIDs). This includes parts of the IP layer such as IPsec or fragmentation, so that those functions can operate on stable ULIDs, even though shim6 may have had to rewrite the packet header. Conversely, the forwarding functionality of the IP layer must be located below the shim6 layer, so that the locators chosen by shim6 are correctly used to select a path. The effect of address rewriting over the chosen path is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The third task is locator update. This is useful if a new locator appears after the initial exchange, that is, after the set of locators has been announced by each peer. This could happen should another Ethernet or WiFi interface become operational. If a locator appears or disappears on a host, it is possible to tell the peer about an updated locator set, so that changes in available paths are taken into account. These locator updates may be useful in some IP mobility scenarios [41] .
In task one, we briefly mention the use of cryptographic mechanisms. These mechanisms have been carefully designed [36] to prevent an attacker from injecting fake addresses, and thus use this attack vector as a basis for new types of attacks. We summarize the critical parts in the next subsection, and address them in more detail later in the paper.
Securing locator sets
A key problem faced by host-based techniques that rely on multiple locators is that the receiver of that packet must be able to verify the origin of a packet that uses a new locator. RFC4218 [37] describes in details the threats that must be considered while designing any IPv6 multihoming solution. The way shim6 responds to those attacks is described in section 16 of [36] . While the solution to many of the threats resides in using well-known protection mechanisms, one particular type of attack, namely address injection, is addressed by a new mechanism that is worth describing here. Address injection consists of an attacker presenting a modified address set to one of the communicating hosts (either by sending fake announcements or modifying existing packets).
The first option proposed by [36] to solve this issue is to use Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [6] . This method relies on the use of a signature to prove that all signed addresses have been generated by the same entity. Rather than using certificates to bind an identity to the signature (which would require a trusted third-party to sign the certificate), the CGA approach is to bind the ULID itself to the signature. For a given public/private key pair, the private key is used to sign the locator set, while the public key is hashed so as to generate the 64 low order bits of the ULID. The length of the hash is artificially extended (see [6] ) so that the actual hash length is not 64 bits, but instead 59 + 16 ⁄ sec bits (where sec is a tunable parameter). Consequently, the security is dependent on an attacker not being able to find a hash collision with a self-generated public key. This property of the hash function is called ''pre-image resistance'', and the time needed to find a collision when the sec parameter is as low as 1 makes such an attack infeasible in short timescales. Over time, when Moores law does eventually make such an attack practical, or for servers that keep a stable address over time, the attack complexity can be increased further by incrementing the security parameter (sec) on the host that generates the signature [6] . With each increase in the security parameter, the complexity required to generate a collision will increase by 2 16⁄sec iterations. This in- creases the cost of address generation, and thus of brute-force attacks, while keeping the cost of address verification constant.
The second option is to bind all addresses together, without using a signature. This type of address is called Hash Based Addresses (HBA) [7] . The 64 low order bits of each address is the result of a hash computation over all the prefixes of the set. An attacker who wishes to inject his own address into the locator set would need to find an input to the hash function that produces, at least, the locator used for forwarding as part of the generated locator set. Since this is made easier by the short length of the hash, HBA uses the same security parameter as CGA to tune the cryptographical strength of the locator set.
HBA is computationally cheaper than CGA, but it also has less flexibility. Its main drawback is that the addition of a new address in a locator set requires regenerating the whole set. This is where CGA-compatible HBA addresses are useful. In that case the hash input includes both a public key and the set of prefixes. This is initially seen by the peer as normal HBA addresses, but if a new prefix must be added afterwards, it can be signed with the public key.
With both these mechanims in place, shim6, as part of the initial context establishment, verifies that the host claiming to be representing ISP2.A (for example, see Fig. 3 ) can be cryptographically tied to that locator (using either the CGA or HBA mechanisms). While an attacker can generate a new address from a subnet prefix and a public key, this attacker cannot impersonate another hosts address. This is, of course, based on the premise that it is currently beyond the capability of an attacker to harness enough computing power to generate a collision in either the HBA or CGA hash functions.
Failure detection and recovery
REAP is responsible for suggesting to shim6 when to change the current path, as well as for finding an alternate path when the current one becomes unavailable. REAP is closely tied to shim6 because it uses its state to monitor the active flows. REAP can be divided in two main features: Flow monitoring and path exploration.
Flow monitoring is started immediately after the shim6 initial locator discovery. It is designed in such a way as to minimise the amount of active probing. The main mechanism that allows for reaching that goal is called Forced Bidirectional Detection (FBD). The communication is forced to be bidirectional in the sense that if an end-host receives Upper Layer Protocol (ULP) data, but does not send anything, then control packets (keepalives) are automatically generated. Given this, it can be concluded that a failure has occurred if a host is sending ULP packets without receiving back any data or keepalives. 2 A host decides that a failure has occurred if its Send Timer expires. The default expiry time Tsend is defined as 15 s in [4] . That timer is stopped whenever a packet enters the networking stack. In addition to the Send timer, a host maintains a Keepalive Timer, that sends a keepalive packet on expiry. This is to ensure that the peer does not think that a failure occurred when in fact the application just stopped sending data. The requirement for a Keepalive Timer is to have an expiry time that verifies Tka + one À way delay < TSend. Currently we set Tka as one third of Tsend, as recommended in [4] .
The second feature of REAP is path exploration. Due to its flow monitoring capability, REAP can react to failures by probing the known paths (address combinations). The probing process, described in detail in [4] , allows for finding an alternate working path, for each direction of the communication. It can even result in the use of different paths for each direction, as it is able to detect unidirectional paths.
Implementation
In this section, we first describe the architecture of our Lin-Shim6 implementation. Then we use measurements to evaluate its performance and motivate some of our design choices. We also take into account related simulation-based studies [15] , and provide further insight on those results based on our implementation.
Architecture overview
We have explained already that shim6 is transparent to applications, however, it should also be economical with system resources. While any implementation will, of necessity, consume resources, efforts to minimise this have been made in LinShim6. This means that special care was taken with parameters that may impact performance. Those parameters are mainly identified as per-packet processing, state management and cryptographic operations. In this section we describe each of those parameters and the approach taken for the LinShim6 implementation. Note that the following explanations are based on Figs. 4 and 5. While Fig. 4 shows the module interconnections, Fig. 5 clarifies the particular ations undertaken by each of them (described below), based on a common scenario.
Considering the separation between kernel space and user space, per-packet processing must be kept in the kernel, as doing otherwise would be very expensive in terms of performance, requiring a context switch for each packet that enters or leaves the system. On the other hand, state management and cryptographic operations are better placed in user space, to allow for ease of maintenance and to avoid kernel bloat.
Per-packet processing can itself be further sub-divided into shim6 trigger heuristic, REAP flow monitoring and address rewriting. For efficiency reasons, all three functions are implemented in the kernel. The shim6 trigger heuristic uses the Netfilter hooks IP6_LOCAL_IN and IP6_LOCAL_OUT. However, LinShim6 does not initiate a new shim6 session each time a packet is sent to a new destination. For each new flow, a shim6 negotiation is triggered if either Trigger bytes of data have passed (we suggest a default of Trigger = 2 KB based on our measurements), or one minute has elapsed with data flowing between two hosts. These values were chosen because they avoid engaging shim6 unless the data flow is either significantly large, or of long enough duration to warrant it. REAP flow monitoring and address rewriting both use the xfrm framework. This framework [49] allows for ease of integration of new layers in the networking stack. xfrm (meaning transform) is designed to allow efficient support for multiple transformations of packets in any order. Originally created for IPsec, where packets must be modified according to certain policies, this framework was later used for Mobile IPv6. In LinShim6 we defined a new type of xfrm transformer, capable of rewriting addresses, inserting the shim6 extension header and detecting failures. Furthermore, we have implemented a variant of LinShim6, called Multipath LinShim6, that handles several paths simultaneously. We use a more efficient approach for this than the one proposed in [36] . [36] defines a concept of context forking, which consists of using one fork of the original Shim6 state per additional path that an application wants to use simultaneously with the first one. This is costly because each additional context needs to be negotiated and occupies space in the system, mostly duplicated from the original context. Instead, our Multipath LinShim6 adds only a few lines of code in the kernel (compared to pure LinShim6) to give the xfrm entity the knowledge of all paths, and attaching a 2 Note that the number of control packets is kept minimal since no keepalive is needed if data exchange is either bidirectional or paused. label (called a path index) to them. Any multipath-aware upper layer (transport or application) can then impose a particular path to Shim6 by attaching a path index to each outgoing packet. An application of Multipath LinShim6 is described in [46, Section 4] .
State management is actually the shim6 control plane. It starts a shim6 negotiation when asked by the shim6 trigger heuristic. When notified about a failure by the xfrm module, it starts a REAP exploration, and informs the xfrm transformer when a new path has been found, so that the corresponding address rewriting can be performed by the kernel. If a new path is discovered (new prefix available on an interface), it updates the peer host with this information.
Finally, the last task performed by LinShim6 are the cryptographic operations. These functions are the most costly from a CPU viewpoint, and must be done as much as possible in advance.
Cryptographic operations include the generation and verification of addresses, as well as signing and verification of important shim6 messages. In the LinShim6 design, a separate tool allows for CGA/ HBA address generation. 3 The tool can be configured to favour either speed of address generation, versus the strength of generated addresses, incurring extra computational cost for the latter. Also, address generation can optionally be run on a configurable number of parallel processor threads, thus taking advantage of multi-core processors. Much of this address generation code was originally written by DoCoMo [25] for SEcure Neighbour Discovery [3] , it was integrated into LinShim6 for the purposes of address generation, 3 Address generation could potentially be done on a completely separate, more powerful machine. and thus it is very similar to the SEND implementation, although our tool features HBA generation as well.
Also, for the purposes of LinShim6, the xfrm framework has been extended by adding the possibility to link two xfrm states that correspond to the two uni-directional communication paths of a data flow. A lookup method based on the context tag has also been added. Details on the working of xfrm and our extensions can be found in [12] .
HBA/CGA
CGA and HBA addresses, which are used to secure shim6, are an integral part of the protocol. At the time of writing and to the best of our knowledge, LinShim6 is the only implementation with full support of HBA and CGA. Supporting these addresses raises operational and performance challenges. From a performance viewpoint, using CGA and HBA addresses may lower the performance of shim6 when compared to normal IPv6. HBA and CGA operations are the most computationally costly parts of LinShim6. We evaluate here the computational impact of using those addresses, first at the generation time (can be done offline), then at the signature and generation time (always online).
HBA/CGA address generation: As the CGA addresses depend on a public/private key pair, our implementation automatically generates such a key-pair during its installation. This is done so that Lin-Shim6 will work ''out-of-the-box'', without complex configuration effort from the user. LinShim6 configures itself automatically with CGA addresses by using this public/private key-pair. It is, of course, perfectly possible to manually configure several public/private key pairs, and also to define any number of HBA-sets. For LinShim6, as CGA addresses can be generated as soon as the host discovers the IPv6 prefix for a network interface, we selected CGA addresses as the default. This implies that CGA addresses are useable on laptops that move regularly, whereas HBA's are not for reasons mentioned previously in Section 2.2.
As explained in [6] , the cost of the CGA generation is of 2 16⁄sec iterations in the worst case, where sec is the security parameter (a larger sec increases the security but also the time required to generate an address). The same worst case cost applies to HBA generation [7] . The worst case complexity for an attacker to find a matching hash for the address is of the order of 2 59 + 16⁄sec iterations [6] , which means that the generator has 2 59 iterations of an advantage in computational cost over the attacker. That said, in general, as processing power increases one should consider increasing the value of the security parameter to protect against brute-force attacks.
To evaluate the cost of generating HBA and CGA addresses, we used a Sunblade x6440 equipped with 4 AMD Opteron 8431 processors, each with 6 cores, clocked at 2.4 GHz. Fig. 6 shows the mean time required to generate HBA or CGA addresses, each bar being the mean of 100 trials. Each bar shows the mean generation time of two addresses, in log scale. The first two sets of bars are generated with a security parameter of 1. The other bars were generated with a security parameter of 2. It is worth noting that the standard deviation (not shown in the figure) is very large, because of the brute-force algorithm [6] used in the generation process. For the results presented in Fig. 6 , we observed a standard deviation ranging from 23% to 77% of the reported mean.
The address generation tool [25] is able to use any number of concurrent threads. This capability was retained and extended in order to support HBA. With the security parameter set to 2, multithreading is necessary in order to obtain a result in a reasonable time. Hence using a security parameter of 1 is the only option on current commodity hardware. When the computational time increases due to a required higher security level, it is clearly beneficial to use as many threads as possible (see the results with 8 threads in the figure, and note that the scale is logarithmic). On the other hand, multithreading gives slightly worse results when the security parameter is 1, because the threading overhead takes a higher proportion of the processing time.
While Fig. 6 shows the generation time for two addresses, we note that if the number of generated addresses is increased, the CGA generation time increases linearly with the number of addresses. On the other hand, there is a barely perceptible increase in HBA generation time. This is because the expensive part (called modifier generation in [6] ) is conducted only once for the whole set, in the HBA case.
Address signature and verification: Both operations take place during the initialisation of a shim6 exchange, or when one of the peers announces changes in its locator set. To evaluate the cost of these cryptographical operations we measured the time needed to carry a shim6 negotiation with different security mechanisms. These tests were performed between two hosts on a 100 Mbps Ethernet. The initiator was a Pentium 4 dual core, 2.6 GHz with 1 GB RAM while the responder was a Pentium 3, 600 MHz with 256 MB RAM.
The results are reported in Fig. 7 . For each security configuration, the case of each peer announcing 2, 5 or 10 addresses in its locator set is compared. The negotiation time is defined as the time elapsed between the transmission of the first I1 message, and the reception of the last negotiation message (R2) (see Fig. 3 ). Note that the negotiation time includes two signatures and two verifications, that is, one for each peer. Each bar shows the median negotiation time over 20 consecutive runs.
Looking at the right hand side of Fig. 7 , we note that there is a strong correlation between the length of the RSA key used for signing messages and the negotiation time. Conversely, HBA addresses involve a negotiation time that is almost the same as if no security were used at all. This is because no signature is needed in the case of HBA addresses.
An important consideration, discussed previously, is that HBA addresses require the knowledge of all the prefixes before commencing a shim6 negotiation. This motivates the use of CGAcompatible HBA addresses which are defined in [7] . While pure HBA addresses use a random number as input of the SHA-1 hash used during the generation process, CGA-compatible HBA addresses use a public key instead of such a number. However, no signature is needed until the host learns of a new prefix that can be used. At this point a CGA address is generated based on the new prefix, and the key used to generate the previous HBA set. A signed message can be sent to the peer, which will use the already known public key to verify the locator update. In Fig. 7 , the bar labelled hbacompat shows the negotiation time needed when an HBA set generated based on a 1024-bit public key is used.
This shows very similar results to the use of pure HBA. The small increase in time is explained by the fact that pure-HBA uses a random number formatted as a 384-bit RSA key, as defined in [7] . A final observation is that the impact of the number of announced addresses (2, 5 or 10 in the figure) is insignificant compared to the security mechanism used. From the above observations, we conclude that from a performance point of view, there is a strong argument to be made for using HBA addresses, or even better, CGA-compatible HBA addresses. LinShim6 allows for generation of HBA/CGA addresses in advance of their use. 4 Once they are generated, they become active only when configured in the system, either manually or by autoconfiguration through the cgad daemon. By default, LinShim6 disables the standard IPv6 auto-configuration mechanism, in order to avoid having both unsecured addresses and HBA/CGA addresses in the system. This mechanism is replaced by the cgad daemon, that listens for Router Advertisements, and configures the appropriate addresses when a new prefix is received.
Improving failure recovery time
The REAP Failure detection mechanism has been evaluated by simulations in [15] . We have evaluated the performance of the implemented path exploration mechanism in [11] . In [15] , de la Oliva et al. emphasise that the TCP exponential backoff has a negative impact on the recovery time seen by an application. The reason is that after a failure, TCP tries to retransmit until a response is received. The delay between successive retransmissions is exponentially increased. Consequently, when REAP finds a new path, TCP unnecessarily waits for its next retransmission before noticing that the communication path is operational again. [15] suggests informing TCP when a new path is found so that it immediately retransmits and recovers. Fig. 7 of [15] provides simulation results that show the effect of the improvement.
In LinShim6, the authors have added a mechanism that allows for notifications to be issued when any multihoming event occurs. This uses the Linux netevent framework. Any module in the kernel can register for such notifications, without the knowledge of the shim6 module. This is important for maintaining the layer separation inside the kernel. TCP thus registers for the PATH_UPDATE event, and receives a notification when a path has been updated. It reacts by resetting all its RTO (Retransmission TimeOut) timers for the TCP sessions that use that path. LinShim6 is also modular enough to support external control from informed entities (such as network monitoring daemons), for example to force a change to another path. One of us (Ronan) has written such a controlling daemon to take ECN information into account [42] .
We tested that implementation in our testbed consisting of a Juniper M10i, as the router, with two Dual Pentium III Blade servers with 512 MB of Ram and Gigabit Interfaces (Fig. 8 ). Both computers were running the IPerf tool for traffic generation. To simulate link failures, links were switched off in the Juniper router via expect scripts. The gain in recovery time is presented in Fig. 9 . This figure is deliberately very similar to Fig. 7 of [15] . The goal was to compare the simulation results with the implementation results. We measure the Application Recovery Time (ART), defined in [15] as the time elapsed between the last packet reception before a failure, and the first packet received after the recovery. The measurement is repeated for different values of TSend (Failure detection timeout). Each point in the figure is the median of 45 measurements performed in the same conditions. Errorbars with percentiles 5 and 95 are also shown.
With our testbed setup, an Application Recovery Time (ART) cannot be below Tsend, because the time of the last packet received is almost equal to the time of the last packet sent (due to the configured packet rate), and the path exploration starts Tsend seconds after the last packet has been sent. In the more general case the lower bound for an ART can be slightly lower as explained in [15] . Fig. 9 confirms the simulation results from [15] . We observe an ART that increases linearly with Tsend if the RTO (TCP Retransmission TimeOut) is reset. On the other hand, in the absence of RTO reset, we observe steps in the curve that are due to TCP waiting for its RTO before performing a retransmission.
Regarding the path exploration, our implementation separates the address pairs used for sending probes into two sets, each one randomised. The first set contains all pairs that are completely distinct from the current (stalled) address pair. The second set contains all other address pairs. The first probes sent use address pairs from the first set, in the hope that using an orthogonal path increases the chance our implementation can find a working path on the first attempt. Indeed, in the testbed setup, this proved to be the case. This also confirms what was simulated in [15] .
While many things are common between our figure and Fig. 7 of [15] , all our experiments (either with or without RTO reset) reveal a faster ART than the one obtained in [15] . One explanation is that while [15] sends a probe to the current address pair before actually triggering an exploration, our implementation begins exploration immediately upon expiration of the Send timer. Probing the current locator pair, before commencing the exploration process, is useful when there is some doubt about the failure. For example, a host could receive a spoofed ICMP destination unreachable message, which should trigger a probe on the current pair, but not an exploration. This is so that the host can attempt to detect whether it was a genuine ICMP message or not. In our instance of Fig. 9 and Fig. 7 of [15] , there is a timer expiry that indicates that no traffic has been seen during Tsend seconds. Since REAP ensures (through keepalives) that the Tsend timer expires only when there is truly a network failure, we argue that this is a sufficient condition to immediately start the path exploration, with the benefit of lowering the ART.
Cost of state maintenance
Shim6 requires state to be maintained at both the initiator (client) and responder (server). Obviously servers usually manage many connections simultaneously, this would then mean that a server could potentially have to manage many shim6 contexts. In order to reduce the load on a server, it may be preferable to disable the LinShim6 heuristic. i.e. the context establishment trigger mechanism. That way, the server will never initiate a shim6 negotiation, but only respond to context creation requests from clients. The first step of a shim6 context initialisation would be the sending of an I1 message by the client. The server would reply with an R1 without creating state. Finally the client would send an I2, at which point context state would be created in the server. The I2 message holds the list of locators from the client, secured with a signature that the server is required to verify. If the I2 message is found to be valid, the server would then create a new context, and reply with an R2 message containing it's own signed locator set. As the locators of a server generally do not change all that often, our implementation computes the signatures in advance, in order to spare computing time during the context negotiation.
In our testbed (the same one as used to generate Fig. 7) , we evaluated the I2 processing time, the results of which can be seen in Fig. 10 . Our tests consisted of the following. Every 50 ms, a client initiated a new context negotiation, each client used a different CGA source address, in order to force the creation of a new context in the server. The CGA was generated with a 1024-bit public key. 1000 such contexts have been created, and the I2 processing time measured. The x-axis shows the number of the clients (and hence context creation requests), sorted in chronological order (context 1000 is created 1000⁄50 ms = 50 s after the first one). The figure shows that even when a hosts has 1000 active contexts, the I2 processing time remains at around 2 ms. Fig. 11 shows the result of a case study of shim6 context management in our university. The netflow traces of several critical servers in our campus have been analysed (Full IPv4 netflow). Traffic was collected from the 1st to the 7th of August, 2008. In our analysis, we assume that each peer would trigger a shim6 negotiation immediately after the first packet is exchanged and that servers are configured with a garbage collection time of 10 s (that is, if no traffic is seen during 10 s related to a particular context, then the server decides that it is no longer used and removes it. Peers having more than 10 s of idle time then need to renegotiate their context). By comparing with Fig. 10 , we can infer that the I2 processing time (cost of creating a new context) would not exceed 2 ms for any of those servers. We also observe from Fig. 11 that even in the worst case where each peer would trigger a shim6 context establishment, the number of concurrent shim6 contexts that need to be maintained is less than 800. Note that in case an administrator wants to reduce the observed number of simultaneous Shim6 contexts, he can lower the garbage collection time, in order to more aggressively drop Shim6 states. This tuning corresponds to moving state from the server to the network: the more aggressive a server is in dropping contexts, the more often clients will need to refeed the context data through network messages.
Having just explained that servers can avoid unnecessary context creation by simply disabling the shim6 heuristic, and only create contexts upon request from the clients, one simple method that clients could use to reduce their shim6 activity would be to introduce into the heuristic ''hints'' about whether the peer supports shim6. In particular we know that, currently, the majority of IPv6 addresses correspond to auto-generated MAC-based addresses. Those addresses can easily be detected thanks to their format, i.e. ff:fe in the middle of the interface identifier. If the peer uses such an address, most probably it has no support for shim6, because the use of multiple addresses by shim6 requires their format to be either HBA or CGA. Heuristics can be implemented as a kernel module, and a user can define his/her own (or indeed modify the existing one), without having to modify the core implementation. So, for example, a heuristic could be defined to ignore auto-generated addresses, or to limit to some maximum the number of simultaneous shim6 contexts.
Open issues with Shim6 multihoming
From a standardisation viewpoint, most of the work on shim6 is finished with several RFC's now published [36, 4, 7] . Our implementation supports all the important features of shim6. However, there are still several outstanding issues to be solved before there will be a widespread deployment of shim6.
A primary issue is that shim6 requires IPv6. As of this writing, the Internet still mainly uses IPv4, but given the expected exhaustion of the IPv4 address space, more and more networks are seriously considering IPv6 and have started deployments [24] . Shim6 could be a very useful feature for multihomed networks. Initially, shim6 could be used for important flows such as VPN, e-commerce or IP telephony servers where rapid recovery from link or interface failures is important. An important advantage of shim6 over other multihoming solutions such as HIP or SCTP, is that shim6 does not require any change to the applications running on hosts. Thus, applications can benefit from shim6 without being aware of it. Simulations studies performed during the early phases of the shim6 development have shown that host-based multihoming techniques such as shim6 allow hosts to use many more paths to send their packets than traditional IPv4 BGP-based multihoming [16] . Furthermore, measurements have shown that by using these additional paths, it is possible to achieve much better performance, e.g. lower delays [16] .
However, there are also some forces against a widespread deployment of shim6. At present, Internet Service Providers are very reluctant to consider it [43] . Their main concern with shim6 is that it allows hosts to influence the path used to send and receive packets towards any multihomed destination. ISP operators have become accustomed to performing traffic engineering by refining their BGP configurations to take into account business policies. Consequently many consider that the deployment of shim6 would limit their traffic engineering capabilities and make the network more difficult to manage [43] . We disagree with such statements. Shim6 provides benefits to both ISPs and their clients. ISPs can benefit from a much more scalable interdomain routing system while clients can benefit from a much larger number of paths providing better performance and more redundancy.
In fact, peer-to-peer applications are also exploiting these alternate paths. Network operators could market shim6 has an added value service to their customers willing to obtain improved performance or reliability. This service could be combined with a path selection service provided by the ISP that allows its clients to easily determine the best path to reach a given destination. This type of service is already being developed to support peer-to-peer applications [1] . Recently, the IETF has chartered the ALTO working group to work on such a service [44] which would be very useful for shim6 to integrate with.
A second issue concerning a widespread deployment of shim6 is that many corporate networks insist on using Provider Independent IP addresses, even for IPv6, instead of Provider Aggregatable addresses [38] . This is because most operators consider that renumbering a network is too complex. Despite a lot of discussions on this topic [14] , the IETF does not provide a solution to easily renumber a corporate network. Thanks to DHCP and IPv6's stateless auto-configuration, most hosts can easily change their address, but for servers and routers this remains difficult. For the specific case of shim6, a complete renumbering solution is not necessary. To easily support provider changes, a corporate network could use private addresses internally (e.g. for the routers and the management servers) and simply add the prefixes allocated by their providers to all their routers. Solutions to address this issue have been proposed in [28] .
Related work
The closest related work are the two prototype implementations developed by Park et al. [39] and Ahrenholz and Henderson [2] . These two implementations have also been developed on the Linux platform. They are mainly user-space implementations with netfilter hooks to capture the shim6 packets and process them in user space daemons. In contrast, our implementation uses the xfrm framework and is implemented partially in the kernel with the non time-sensitive functions in user space. Another important difference is that our implementation completely supports the security mechanisms designed for shim6.
Other solutions have been developed to solve the multihoming problem. The SCTP transport protocol [45] was initially designed to support signaling servers in IP telephony environments. It has now been extended to support wider deployment scenarios and is supported by several operating systems. Another example is the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [31] . HIP has been developed to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of using a new cryptographical identifier namespace on top of IP. HIP has been extended to support multihoming and mobility [33] and there are several implementations of HIP available [26] . Compared to these solutions, the main benefit of shim6 is that it does not require any change to the applications. This is very important for a new technique that needs to be incrementally deployed.
Several years ago, based on the recommendation from [30] , the Routing Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) was rechartered to consider the evolution of the Internet architecture. Several of the techniques being evaluated within this working group [5, 19, 47] rely on separating the identifier and locator roles of the IP addresses, as in shim6. Although the details between these protocols and shim6 vary, the experience gained by the implementation and utilisation of shim6 will be beneficial for the development of these new protocols. For some, the issue of mobility is related to multihoming. Briefly, mobility consists of using several addresses in sequence, while multihoming consists of using them in parallel. Several issues are shared by both approaches as raised by Bagnulo et al. [8] . One of the authors (Barré), has evaluated a similar approach to [8] for managing mobility and multihoming in one shared solution. This resulted as well in a new implementation based on Lin-Shim6, called MipShim6 [13] .
Finally, recently an IETF working group has been created (MPT-CP) to design a modified version of TCP, called Multipath TCP [22] , that is able to failover from one path to another, and to spread one single transport flow across several paths. This is achieved by appropriately rethinking the congestion control algorithms. This is a promising approach to achieve better resource pooling in the Internet [48] . The architecture of the new MPTCP protocol [21] supports any technology that is able to expose multiple paths to the end-host, shim6 being one of them. One of us (Barré) is also the author of the reference implementation for MPTCP [10] . Although the IETF requested that such a reference implementation be independent of Shim6, the multipath version of LinShim6 (see Section 3.1) can be plugged into that implementation to provide a path management service for the MPTCP transport layer.
Conclusion
Multihoming is one of the problems that limits the scalability of the current Internet architecture, because it is currently obtained through injection of additional routes in the BGP system. In this paper, we have described and evaluated our implementation in the Linux kernel of the shim6 host-based multihoming technique developed within the IETF. We have first explained the basics of this technique including the defined security mechanisms. Then, we detailed the architecture of our LinShim6 implementation along with the motivations for our main design choices. We have then evaluated the performance impact of the main security mechanisms of shim6. Finally, we have discussed the issues that remain open for a widespread deployment of shim6, while recognising that LinShim6 is currently the only complete and publicly available shim6 implementation. The modularity of LinShim6 has been shown already by its applications to mobility and multipath. This efficient, modular kernel architecture can be reused in the design of future protocols based on locator/id separation.
